WAFing it up

I should disclose up front that I derive my living today supporting WAF technologies for a large corporation, and so it will come as no surprise that I have a few opinions on the use of WAF technology and in general how to go about protecting web applications.

Purists.
If you’re a purist and feel adamantly for or against Web Application Firewalls, I would urge you to consider the roots of defense-in-depth – just like the spoon in The Matrix, there is no silver bullet. OWASP‘s concepts are as close as we’ll ever get to that silver bullet.

Secure Coding won’t get you out of every vulnerability and neither will a WAF, if for no other reason than the sheer complexity of the equipment needed to stand up web-enabled services introduces too many interdependencies to think every coder, developer, and vendor got everything right and there will never be a problem. — If you disagree with that, put down the Vendor Kool-Aid now before it’s too late.

Positive / Negative Security Models
Good grief.  Techie speak if ever there was any. Reminds me of the James Garner movie Tank, where little Billy is exposed to negative feedback in order to arrest his “bad” behavior. In my house, that’s called a spanking and you get one when it’s appropriate. My kids know what a spanking is and so does anyone reading this thread. Without googling, name two WAF products based on each of these Security Models: Positive & Negative — It’s okay, I’ll wait for you.

And we’re back…
On the topic of Security Models, I tend to think it takes a combination of protective technologies to provide any actual risk/threat  mitigation. I would personally like to see developers take advantage of a WAF’s ability to see how an application behaves. Moste developers don’t think of in terms of which web page does what, instead they’re working with APIs and objects. This is unfortunate because the rest of the world sees these applications as URL’s. The WAF can be that bridge to the developers. A WAF could in theory help the developer ensure that a specific sequence of events happens before a transaction is processed or prompt the client before transactions occur in specific instances to avoid CRSF.

To bring things back around to my original point. I do agree that the more complex a web application is and the more servers required to make a service available online, the more vulnerable and difficult to secure that application or service will be. I’m not sure who’s law that is but I’m sure one exists, complexity breeds more complexity.

No surprise there, if you are protecting a complex asset then it will be high maintenance — I said to put down the Kool-Aid, it’s for you own good – nothing is free!

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Posted on May 26, 2009, in Security / Risk, Security Management and tagged , , . Bookmark the permalink. Leave a comment.

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